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INTRODUCTION 
On February 28, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, a case brought in U.S. federal court by Nigerian plaintiffs 
seeking to hold a Dutch company liable for human rights abuses committed in 
Nigeria.1 The plaintiffs brought this suit under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),2 a 
statute that gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over certain international law 
violations. This brief symposium contribution explores some early cases involving 
state court jurisdiction over common law tort claims for personal injuries that 
occurred on foreign soil. It suggests that, although the existence of jurisdiction over 
such “transitory tort”3 claims is relatively undisputed, the exercise of such 
jurisdiction might not be warranted in certain transnational human rights cases 
that have the potential to disrupt foreign relations, or that duplicate other 
countries’ efforts to enforce applicable conduct-regulating rules within their own 
borders. It concludes that, following the model of transitory torts, U.S. courts are 
most justified in exercising jurisdiction over non-frivolous allegations that the 
defendant (or the defendant’s agents) violated universally recognized prohibitions 
 
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. My thanks to Bill Dodge 
for comments and to Kara Slack for research assistance. 
1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (2012) (No. 10-
1491), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/10-1491.pdf. 
For more background on the litigation, see Chimène I. Keitner, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: 
Another Round in the Fight over Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, AM. SOC’Y INT’L LAW (Sept. 
30, 2010), http://www.asil.org/insights100930.cfm. 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
3. See infra Part I. 
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on conduct when the claimant cannot seek meaningful redress against the 
defendant in the state where the conduct occurred. 
The central question presented in Kiobel was whether corporations could be 
sued for international law violations under the ATS.4 Although plaintiffs regularly 
name corporations as defendants in tort suits brought under U.S. state and federal 
law, some questioned whether the same was possible in suits brought under the 
ATS’s peculiar grant of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs seek to bring suits against 
corporations because it may be easier to secure personal jurisdiction over 
multinational corporations than over individual human rights violators or foreign 
states themselves. It may also be easier to obtain and enforce damages awards 
against corporations, and corporations may be more affected by the deterrent 
effect of tort suits than foreign government actors.5 However, the oral argument 
in Kiobel revealed that the justices were not concerned solely about the question of 
corporate liability.6 One week following oral argument, the Court ordered 
additional briefing and argument on the question of whether the ATS allows U.S. 
federal courts to recognize a cause of action for international law violations that 
took place in another country.7 The Court scheduled the second oral argument for 
October 1, 2012.8 
Most suits brought under the ATS involve conduct outside the territorial 
United States. Plaintiffs may pursue claims in U.S. courts precisely because they 
are unable to obtain redress in the courts of the country where the conduct 
occurred. One effect of recent challenges to the ATS’s grant of federal jurisdiction 
has been renewed interest in pursuing human rights claims in U.S. state courts and 
under state law. Royal Dutch Petroleum’s defense counsel Kathleen Sullivan 
concluded oral argument in Kiobel by stating: 
Your Honor, we do not urge a rule of corporate impunity here. 
Corporate officers are liable for human rights violations and for those 
they direct among their employees. There can also be suits under State 
 
4. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 3 (“The principal issue before this Court is 
the narrow issue of whether a corporation can ever be held liable for violating fundamental human 
rights norms under the Alien Tort Statute.”). 
5. For more on the functions and effects of corporate ATS cases, see Chimène I. Keitner, 
Optimizing Liability for Extraterritorial Torts: A Response to Professor Sykes, 100 GEO. L.J. 2211 (2012); 
Chimène I. Keitner, Some Functions of Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 43 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1015 (2012); Alan 
O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic 
Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161 (2012). 
6. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 11–13. 
7. For more on the reargument order, see Chimène I. Keitner, The Reargument Order in Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and Its Potential Implications for Transnational Human Rights Cases, AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L LAW (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.asil.org/insights120321.cfm. 
8. Monthly Argument Calendar for the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2012, U.S. 
SUPREME CT. (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_calendars/ 
MonthlyArgumentCalOct2012.pdf. 
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law or the domestic laws of [other] nations, but there may not be ATS 
Federal common law causes of action against corporations.9 
Kiobel’s counsel Paul Hoffman agreed about the role of state courts, although he 
disagreed about the reach of the ATS: 
These plaintiffs could bring this case in State court. What the Alien Tort 
Statute does is provide a Federal forum when these torts are in violation 
of the law of nations. And that’s really what it—what the Founders 
intended and what—and what it does.10 
If the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel further restricts federal jurisdiction 
under the ATS, state court judges could start seeing more human rights cases in 
their courtrooms. Whether or not Kiobel narrows the federal jurisdictional grant, 
domestic courts will continue to confront the question of whether and on what 
basis to assert jurisdiction over human rights claims with little or no connection to 
the forum state. Early cases based on the transitory tort theory show that U.S. 
judges took for granted that jurisdiction existed over claims based on 
extraterritorial conduct.11 The question was whether to exercise such jurisdiction, 
based on factors including the availability of redress in the place where the 
conduct occurred.12 Examining these early cases can inform the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s reasoning about the extraterritoriality question in Kiobel, as well as state 
courts’ ability and willingness to exercise jurisdiction in transnational human rights 
cases. 
I. JURISDICTION OVER TRANSITORY TORTS IN EARLY U.S. CASES 
Those who advocate keeping U.S. state and federal courts open to claims for 
human rights violations committed by foreigners on foreign soil often invoke the 
common law notion of “transitory torts.”13 Paul Hoffman referred to the 
transitory tort model in the first oral argument in Kiobel, citing the 1774 English 
case Mostyn v. Fabrigas for the proposition that U.S. jurisdiction exists over 
tortfeasers found within the United States, even if the injurious conduct occurred 
 
9. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 52. 
10. Id. at 14. 
11. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
12. See id. 
13. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks on the Role of 
International Law in Human Rights Litigation in the United States (Apr. 22, 1988) in 82 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L L. PROC. 456, 471 (1988); William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts 
Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 487, 520 (1986); Kenneth Randall, 
Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 1, 62, 68–69 (1986); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien Tort 
Claims Act and Its Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 585, 587–89 (2004); Nicholas W. 
Van Aelstyn & William S. Dodge, Brief of Professors of Federal Jurisdiction and Legal History as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents, 28 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 116 (2005). 
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elsewhere.14 Hoffman argued that U.S. courts could hear cases involving 
extraterritorial conduct under the ATS and as a matter of common law.15 
Because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, plaintiffs often filed 
early claims involving transitory torts in state court. While some of these common 
law claims for injuries sustained outside the forum involved parties from, and 
conduct in, other U.S. states,16 others involved non-U.S. parties and non-U.S. 
conduct. Records have survived from at least four cases that were brought in state 
court in the 1790s by U.S. plaintiffs against foreigners for conduct that occurred 
outside of the United States, including Waters v. Collot (Pennsylvania, 1794), Rose v. 
Cochrane (New York, 1794), Dunant v. Perroud (Pennsylvania, 1796), and Parnell & 
Stewart v. Sinclair (Virginia, 1797).17 Two of the suits (Collot and Perroud) involved 
conduct in French colonies by French colonial officials, one (Cochrane) involved 
conduct by a British captain on board a British ship during the evacuation of 
Charleston, and one (Sinclair) involved conduct by a British privateer on the high 
seas.18 In each of these cases, the state court had jurisdiction by virtue of the 
foreign defendant’s transitory presence in the United States at the time of the 
suit.19 
The Pennsylvania court’s opinion in Waters v. Collot is the only opinion from 
these four early state court cases that seems to have survived. In that case, plaintiff 
Waters relied in part on the English case Mostyn v. Fabrigas.20 Waters cited Mostyn 
primarily for the proposition that an individual official can be held personally 
liable for acts performed on behalf of the state,21 while Paul Hoffman recently 
cited Mostyn in oral argument for the proposition that torts committed in one 
jurisdiction can be heard in the courts of another.22 
 
14. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. 
Rep. 1021 (K.B.)). 
15. Id. at 9, 14. 
16. E.g., Ackerson v. Erie Ry. Co., 31 N.J.L. 309, 310–12 (1865) (in a suit brought in New 
Jersey for an injury sustained in New York, indicating that “[i]t is, in the international code, the well 
established doctrine, that every nation may rightfully exercise jurisdiction over all persons within its 
domains, with regard to matters purely personal,” and that transitory actions “are universally founded 
on the supposed violation of rights, which, in contemplation of law, have no locality”). 
17. I recount this litigation in greater detail in Chimène I. Keitner, The Forgotten History of 
Foreign Official Immunity, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 704 (2012). Not all records relating to these cases have 
been preserved; while it is clear that Waters and Parnell were brought in state court, it is most likely but 
not absolutely certain that Rose and Dunant were brought in state court. Id. at 713–45. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 742. 
20. See Waters v. Collot, 2 Yeates 26, 28 (Pa. 1795); see also Keitner, supra note 17, at 718–19. 
A version of the Waters opinion is also reported at 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247 (Pa. 1796). 
21. Waters, 2 Yeates at 27 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.)). 
22. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8. 
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Even though defendants could be sued where they were found, U.S. judges 
retained the discretion to decline to exercise transitory tort jurisdiction.23 They 
were particularly loath to expend U.S. judicial resources in cases involving a 
foreign (rather than a U.S.) claimant, when the claimant could just as easily obtain 
redress in his or her home jurisdiction.24 For example, in Gardner v. Thomas, a 
British sailor sued the British master of a British ship for an assault and battery 
allegedly committed aboard the vessel.25 On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Judicature, the parties argued about whether a New York court had jurisdiction 
over the sailor’s claim.26 Justice Yates concluded that there was “concurrent” 
jurisdiction with British courts over the “private remedy” for assault and battery, 
but that a New York court could justifiably “refus[e] to take cognizance” of the 
claim on prudential grounds.27 
It must be conceded that the law of nations gives complete and entire 
jurisdiction to the courts of the country to which the vessel belongs, but 
not exclusively. It is exclusive only as it respects the public injury but 
concurrent with the tribunals of other nations as to the private remedy. 
There may be cases, however, where the refusal to take cognizance of 
causes for such torts may be justified by the manifest public 
inconvenience and injury which it would create to the community of both 
nations; and the present is such a case.28 
Justice Yates concluded, 
It is evident, then, that our courts may take cognizance of torts committed 
on the high seas, on board of a foreign vessel where both parties are 
foreigners; but I am inclined to think it must, on principles of policy, 
often rest in the sound discretion of the court to afford jurisdiction or 
not, according to the circumstances of the case.29 
In this case, Justice Yates held that the trial court should not have entered a 
judgment for the sailor because the ship was en route back to the United 
Kingdom, and the sailor could seek redress there.30  
In a later case involving a British sailor who did not intend to return to the 
United Kingdom, the New York Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over an 
assault and battery claim by a British master on board a British vessel; the court 
reasoned that “[i]f the plaintiff was legally discharged from the vessel, the 
principle, which declines jurisdiction, ought not to be carried so far as to compel 
 
23. E.g., Gardner v. Thomas, 14 Johns. 134, 135 (N.Y. 1817). The presiding judge was likely 
Joseph C. Yates, who later became Governor of New York. See id. at 136. 
24. E.g., id. at 138. 
25. Id. at 136–37. 
26. Id. at 136. 
27. Id. at 137. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 137–38. 
30. Id. at 138.  
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the plaintiff to return with his witnesses to England, to obtain redress for the 
assault committed.”31 The court observed that “[u]nder such circumstances, to 
send the plaintiff to a foreign tribunal, would be a denial of justice.”32 These 
opinions underscore the difference between the existence of jurisdiction and a 
court’s decision to exercise that jurisdiction—a theme that surfaces in other 
opinions involving transitory torts from this period. 
Justice James of the New York County Supreme Court expressed a similar 
view when confronted with a suit for an alleged assault and battery committed in 
Canada.33 Both parties resided in Canada, but the defendant happened to 
“casually” be in New York when served with process.34 In dicta, the court 
expressed skepticism about the wisdom of adjudicating the case, as a matter of 
policy.35 Nonetheless, Justice James declared that, “as a question of law this court 
has jurisdiction of torts committed in a foreign country, between non-resident 
foreigners; but as a matter of policy will only exercise it in its discretion, in 
exceptional cases.”36 Such exceptional cases included attempts by the defendant to 
evade justice: “[I]f a foreigner flee[s] to this country, he may be pursued and 
prosecuted here.”37 The policy in favor of discretionary dismissal of transitory tort 
actions where an adequate alternative forum exists is consistent with dismissal on 
the grounds of forum non conveniens, and with a prudential requirement to 
exhaust available local remedies in certain types of cases. 
These early U.S. cases indicate that jurisdiction over transitory tort claims 
exists, but that courts may, under certain circumstances, decline to exercise it. 
Joseph Story observed the following in his 1834 Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: 
There are nations, indeed, which wholly refuse to take cognizance of 
controversies between foreigners, and remit them for relief to their own 
domestic tribunals, or to that of the party defendant; and, especially, as to 
matters originating in foreign countries. . . . But this is a matter of mere 
municipal policy and convenience, and does not result from any 
principles of international law. In England, and America, . . . suits are 
maintainable, and are constantly maintained between foreigners, where 
 
31. Johnson v. Dalton, 1 Cow. 543, 549–50 (N.Y. 1823). 
32. Id. at 550. 
33. Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31, 33 (N.Y. 1868). The presiding judge was likely Amaziah 
B. James. Id. at 34. 
34. Id. at 33. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 34. Justice James explicitly discounted Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb. Pr. 316 (N.Y. 1859), in 
which the New York Court of Common Pleas had declined jurisdiction over an assault committed in 
California by a citizen of the state of California, on the grounds that the “case [was] not regarded as 
authority in this court,” and that its holding was inconsistent with other decisions by New York state 
courts in cases involving personal injuries committed abroad. Dewitt, 54 Barb. at 32. 
37. Dewitt, 54 Barb. at 33. 
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either of them is within the territory of the state, in which the suit is 
brought.38 
In sum, state court adjudication of claims between foreigners relating to foreign 
conduct was often disfavored as a matter of policy, but it was not precluded as a 
matter of law.39 
II. THE ATS AND FEDERAL COURTS 
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala invoked the idea of 
transitory torts in order to justify adjudicating human rights claims in U.S. 
courts.40 In Filártiga the family of a Paraguayan victim sued a former Paraguayan 
official for torture and extrajudicial killing that took place in Paraguay.41 The 
Second Circuit cited Lord Mansfield’s 1774 decision in Mostyn v. Fabrigas and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s 1843 decision in McKenna v. Fisk to support the proposition 
that 
[i]t is not extraordinary for a court to adjudicate a tort claim arising 
outside of its territorial jurisdiction. A state or nation has a legitimate 
interest in the orderly resolution of disputes among those within its 
borders, and where the lex loci delicti commissi is applied, it is an expression 
of comity to give effect to the laws of the state where the wrong 
occurred.42 
As in Kiobel, the dispute in Filártiga came down to the proper interpretation of the 
ATS as a basis for suit in federal court; Peña-Irala “conceded” that he could have 
been sued in New York state court for the same conduct because “in personam 
jurisdiction [had] been obtained over [him], the parties agree[d] that the acts 
alleged would violate Paraguayan law, and the policies of the forum [were] 
consistent with the foreign law.”43 
It is not difficult to understand why the Filártigas sued Peña-Irala in New 
York rather than in Paraguay; one Paraguayan lawyer who attempted to help them 
was threatened and subsequently disbarred, two other lawyers withdrew from the 
case after they were threatened, and Paraguayan authorities refused to prosecute 
 
38. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 542 (Boston, Little, 
Brown, and Co., 8th ed. 1883). 
39. The judicial discretion to decline to adjudicate claims involving transnational transitory 
torts stands in contrast with the judicial obligation to exercise jurisdiction under a federal 
jurisdictional grant (despite concurrent state court jurisdiction), or to exercise jurisdiction over a 
constitutional question entrusted to the courts. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 29 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 
(1821); Wadleigh v. Veazie, 28 F. Cas. 1319, 1320 (C.C.D. Me. 1838) (No. 17,031). 
40. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). 
41. Id. at 878. 
42. Id. at 885 (citing Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1024, and McKenna 
v. Fisk, 42 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1843)). 
43. Id. 
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Peña-Irala.44 As Justice Kennedy remarked in the Kiobel oral argument: “[T]he only 
place [the Filártigas] could sue was in the United States. [Peña-Irala] was an 
individual. He was walking down the streets of New York, and the victim saw him 
walking down the streets of New York and brought the suit.”45 Justice Kennedy 
wondered whether the same jurisdictional principles should permit suits against 
multinational corporations.46 
In Filártiga, there was no doubt that the U.S. court had personal jurisdiction 
over Peña-Irala since he was physically present in the United States, having 
overstayed a tourist visa.47 The question was whether the court also had subject-
matter jurisdiction over the claims.48 The Filártigas’ complaint alleged that Peña-
Irala’s conduct violated international treaties, customary international law, and 
New York state law.49 The complaint named several bases for federal jurisdiction, 
including the ATS.50 
As the U.S. Supreme Court later explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the 
First Congress enacted the ATS to provide aliens with a federal forum to bring 
suits for violations of the law of nations, which could previously be brought only 
in state court.51 The cause of action came from “the common law of the time,” 
which included customary international law.52 Accordingly, several years after the 
ATS was enacted, Attorney General William Bradford opined that there was 
federal jurisdiction for a civil suit against Americans who had aided and abetted a 
French attack on a British colony in Sierra Leone.53 
In Sosa, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the scope of the ATS’s 
jurisdictional grant and held that the ATS allows federal courts to “recognize 
private claims under federal common law” for violations of international norms 
with as least as much “definite content and acceptance among civilized nations [as] 
the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted” in 1789.54 Because the 
alleged violation in that case did not meet this threshold, the Court did not need 
to consider other aspects of ATS cases.55 
 
44. See WILLIAM J. ACEVES, THE ANATOMY OF TORTURE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
FILARTIGA V. PENA-IRALA 23 (2007). 
45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 13–14. 
46. See id. at 5. 
47. See ACEVES, supra note 44, at 30. 
48. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 878–80. 
49. See ACEVES, supra note 44, at 215–16 (showing a copy of the Verified Complaint in 
Filártiga v. Peña-Irala). 
50. Id. at 215. 
51. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716–18 (2004). 
52. Id. at 714 (holding that “federal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional grant 
was on the books, because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been recognized within 
the common law of the time”). 
53. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y. Gen. 57, 58–59 (1795). 
54. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
55. Id. at 738. 
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When a human rights case involves conduct outside the forum state’s 
territory, there are at least three potential sources of applicable law: the domestic 
law of the place where the conduct occurred (lex loci), the domestic law of the 
forum state (lex fori),56 and international law. Different sources of law may govern 
different aspects of the same case.57 In Sosa, amici professors of federal 
jurisdiction and legal history took the position that “the ATS did not provide for 
the extraterritorial application of United States law. Instead, it provided 
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes under a law that was already binding everywhere 
in the world—the law of nations.”58 
International law differentiates between a country’s jurisdiction to prescribe 
rules regulating conduct and its jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes59—the 
international law analogs of legislative and judicial jurisdiction, respectively. When 
a U.S. court applies foreign law, it arguably exercises only adjudicatory jurisdiction, 
because the applicable conduct-regulating rule has been prescribed by the foreign 
state. Scholars disagree about whether ATS cases involve the exercise of 
prescriptive or adjudicatory jurisdiction, since the relevant conduct-regulating rules 
come from international law, while the cause of action is supplied by federal 
common law.60 
According to the brief of amici professors of federal jurisdiction and legal 
history (other aspects of which the Sosa court explicitly adopted61): 
A district court hearing a suit based on a tort in violation of the law of 
nations that occurred in Sierra Leone would not be prescribing rules of 
conduct for parties in a foreign country but would rather be enforcing 
rules of law that were as binding in Sierra Leone as they were in the 
United States.62 
Like the Second Circuit in Filártiga, amici professors cited Mostyn v. Fabrigas for the 
proposition that “[i]n the late-18th Century, tort actions were considered to be 
transitory and could be brought wherever the tortfeasor was found.”63 According 
to this view, the ATS is not an instance of jurisdictional overreaching because it 
reflects the well-established model of transitory torts. 
 
56. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 993, 995 (9th ed. 2009). 
57. For a discussion of the choice of law question in ATS cases, see Chimène I. Keitner, 
Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Litigation, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 61, 73–74 (2008). 
58. Van Aelstyn & Dodge, supra note 13, at 116–17; see also William S. Dodge, Alien Tort 
Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 35, 37–44 (2010). 
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401 (1986). 
60. See Dodge, supra note 58, at 38–44 (disagreeing with Professor Michael Ramsey’s view that 
U.S. courts exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in ATS cases and arguing that such cases instead involve 
the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction); Keitner, supra note 57, at 80–81. 
61. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (citing and agreeing with the position 
advanced in the amicus brief). 
62. Van Aelstyn & Dodge, supra note 13, at 117. 
63. Id. at 116. 
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Some have argued that the transitory tort model “does not provide an 
apposite analogy” in transnational human rights cases,64 because the transitory tort 
model contemplates applying foreign law (lex loci). Proponents of the transitory 
tort model counter that customary international law is lex loci, because it applies 
to conduct everywhere.65 
Disagreement persists about the substantive law governing ATS claims. The 
district court grappled with this question on remand in Filártiga.66 
Does the “tort” to which the statute refers mean a wrong “in violation of 
the law of nations” or merely a wrong actionable under the law of the 
appropriate sovereign state? The latter construction would make the 
violation of international law pertinent only to afford jurisdiction. The 
court would then, in accordance with traditional conflict of laws 
principles, apply the substantive law of Paraguay. If the “tort” to which 
the statute refers is the violation of international law, the court must look 
to that body of law to determine what substantive principles to apply.67 
Ultimately, the district court determined that international law applied, reasoning 
that “[b]y enacting Section 1350 Congress entrusted that task [of enforcing the 
prohibition of torture] to the federal courts and gave them power to choose and 
develop federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law 
incorporated into U.S. common law.”68 
In exercising this power, the court found it appropriate to “consider the 
interests of Paraguay to the extent they do not inhibit the appropriate enforcement 
of the applicable international law or conflict with the public policy of the United 
States.”69 The court emphasized that “the written Paraguayan law prohibits 
torture,”70 making the choice between Paraguayan law and international law a false 
conflict. Finally, the court found that, although punitive damages would not be 
available under Paraguayan law, it was “essential and proper to grant the remedy 
of punitive damages in order to give effect to the manifest objectives of the 
international prohibition against torture.”71 
The idea that the forum state might afford a remedy that is different from 
the one provided by the place of injury is consistent with the transitory tort model. 
In Mexican Central Railway Co. v. Gehr, the court explained, 
  The right to obtain redress for false imprisonment being given by the 
laws of Mexico, where the injury was committed, the forms of remedy 
 
64. David Wallach, The Alien Tort Statute and the Limits of Individual Accountability in International 
Law, 46 STAN. J. INT’L L. 121, 138 n.108 (2010). 
65. See Van Aelstyn & Dodge, supra note 13, at 117. 
66. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 863. 
69. Id. at 863–64. 
70. Id. at 864. 
71. Id. at 865. 
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afforded by the law of this State, where the action is brought, will control 
in affording the redress guaranteed by both jurisdictions. And whether 
our forms or remedy correspond with theirs or not, is immaterial.72 
Similarly, in Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. (an interstate case), the 
court indicated that “the law of the place where the right was acquired, or the 
liability was incurred, will govern as to the right of action; while all that pertains 
merely to the remedy will be controlled by the law of the state where the action is 
brought.”73 That said, in Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a wrongful act done in a place foreign to the forum court’s 
jurisdiction is not subject to the lex fori in regards to its “quality or 
consequences.”74 Chief Justice Fuller, writing in dissent, would have applied the 
general rule that the remedy is procedural in nature and thus governed by lex 
fori.75 
The ability to adjudicate a claim and provide a remedy for a transitory tort 
presupposes a legally binding restriction on the defendant’s conduct that gives an 
injured plaintiff the right to seek redress. International law does not fit this model 
neatly because it contains conduct-regulating rules that are translated into “causes 
of action” by domestic legal systems and by international courts. However, this 
does not mean that a transitory tort claim can never be based on a violation of 
international (as opposed to municipal) law; it simply means that the policies 
animating the transitory tort model should be borne in mind when this model is 
deployed to enforce international law. As Justice Holmes noted in Cuba Railroad 
Co. v. Crosby, “The extension of the hospitality of our courts to foreign suitors 
must not be made a cover for injustice to the defendants of whom they happen to 
be able to lay hold.”76 Under the ATS, the federal jurisdictional grant depends on 
an international law prohibition of sufficient universality and specificity to avoid 
making U.S. tort suits “a cover for injustice to . . . defendants” who are subject to 
the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts.77 
The substantive law governing pendent state law claims brought in ATS 
cases will generally be determined by following the choice-of-law rules of the 
forum state.78 State courts may be even more willing than federal courts to apply 
lex fori to both the substantive and remedial aspects of cases involving 
extraterritorial conduct.79 State courts may also fail to distinguish between their 
jurisdiction to hear a case and their jurisdiction to define the applicable rules of 
 
72. Mexican Cent. Ry. Co. v. Gehr, 66 Ill. App. 173, 193 (1896). 
73. Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 11, 13 (1883). 
74. Slater v. Mexican Nat’l R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). 
75. Id. at 132 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
76. Cuba R.R. Co. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912). 
77. Id. 
78. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 709–12 (2004). 
79. See Katherine Florey, State Law, U.S. Power, Foreign Disputes: Understanding the Extraterritorial 
Effects of State Law in the Wake of Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 92 B.U. L. REV. 535, 563 (2012). 
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conduct.80 From an international law perspective, the application of lex fori in the 
form of state law constitutes an exercise of prescriptive, as well as adjudicatory, 
jurisdiction. The question then becomes whether such an exercise is justified. 
III. TRANSITORY TORTS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the first Kiobel oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts expressed concern 
about the exercise of federal jurisdiction in response to Paul Hoffman’s reliance 
on the transitory tort theory to support U.S. jurisdiction over foreign conduct.81 
The Chief Justice asked: “If—if there is no other country where this suit could 
have been brought, regardless of what American domestic law provides, isn’t it a 
legitimate concern that allowing the suit itself contravenes international law?”82 
Hoffman emphasized that “international law, from the time of the Founders to 
today, uses domestic tribunals, domestic courts, and domestic legislation, as the 
primary engines to enforce international law.”83 The international law rules that 
Chief Justice Roberts were referring to are structural principles of international law 
that govern the horizontal allocation of authority among sovereign states.84 The 
international law rules that Hoffman was referring to involve substantive rules 
governing the conduct of states, individuals, and other actors.85 
From the perspective of a forum non conveniens motion, an injured party’s 
inability to bring a claim where the conduct occurred weighs in favor of the forum 
state exercising jurisdiction; paradoxically, in Kiobel, some of the justices wondered 
whether the lack of a viable alternative remedy counseled against the exercise of 
U.S. jurisdiction over conduct that occurred outside the United States.86 
From an international law perspective, the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
to prescribe legal rules is considered acceptable for particular types of conduct.87 
According to the principle of universal jurisdiction, the United States may 
authorize its courts to entertain proceedings for violations of certain conduct-
regulating rules committed by non-U.S. nationals outside of the territorial United 
States.88 The United States has done so in recent decades for conduct including 
torture, genocide, acts of international terrorism, war crimes, and the recruitment 
or use of child soldiers.89 
 
80. Id. at 560. 
81. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 6. 
84. I propose and explain this distinction between substantive and structural rules in Chimène 
I. Keitner, Germany v. Italy and the Limits of Horizontal Enforcement: Some Reflections from a U.S. Perspective, 
11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 167 (2013). 
85. Id. 
86. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 8. 
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1986). 
88. Id. 
89. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2006) (establishing 
jurisdiction for district courts to hear suits brought by American citizens victimized by international 
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Disagreement persists about whether the principle of universal jurisdiction 
entitles domestic courts to entertain civil claims as well as criminal prosecutions. 
To the extent that countries are engaging in an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
it seems that the core issue is whether a country may establish a prohibition on 
conduct absent a “traditional” jurisdictional nexus such as territory (location of 
the conduct) or nationality (citizenship or residence of the offender),90 irrespective 
of the type of proceeding used to enforce that prohibition. The transitory tort 
paradigm assumes that the forum state is not exercising prescriptive jurisdiction. 
The principle of universal jurisdiction, by contrast, specifically envisions that the 
forum state will prescribe rules prohibiting certain types of conduct;91 if such a 
prescription exists (for example, under the U.S. Torture Victim Protection Act92), 
additional constraints on universal jurisdiction come from limits on its exercise 
rather than its existence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Transnational human rights claims brought in U.S. courts based on universal 
jurisdiction norms should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
whether the cause of action comes from federal common law or from state law. 
Similarly, transnational human rights claims brought for violations of foreign law 
should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where a court of 
general jurisdiction has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. That said, in 
addition to being subject to the usual pleading standards and other threshold 
constraints, certain transnational human rights cases may have the potential to 
disrupt foreign relations, or may duplicate other countries’ efforts to enforce 
applicable conduct-regulating rules within their own borders. As a general matter, 
one would expect that U.S. courts will be more willing to exercise their jurisdiction 
in cases that have a connection to the United States. 
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. As New York Supreme 
Court Justice James wrote in 1868, a U.S. court may exercise its “jurisdiction of 
torts committed in a foreign country, between non-resident foreigners . . .  
 
terrorism); Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340B (2006); War 
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2006); Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-340, 122 Stat. 3735 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Torture Victim 
Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Genocide Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-151, 121 Stat. 1821 (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)). 
90. See, e.g., Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 735, 745 (2004) (“In positive and slightly pedantic terms, universal jurisdiction can be defined as 
prescriptive jurisdiction over offences committed abroad by persons who, at the time of commission, 
are non-resident aliens, where such offences are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental 
interests of the prescribing state or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects within its territory.”). 
91. The list of “universal jurisdiction” norms is generally thought to include torture, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). 
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).  
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in exceptional cases.”93 Justice James recognized that such “exceptional cases” 
include cases in which “a foreigner flee[s] to this country”94 and would not face 
justice elsewhere, as exemplified by the Filártiga case. The U.S. Supreme Court 
should have faith in lower courts’ discretionary power to limit the exercise of their 
jurisdiction, rather than declare categorically for the first time in Kiobel that such 
jurisdiction does not exist. 
 
 
93. Dewitt v. Buchanan, 54 Barb. 31, 34 (N.Y. 1868). 
94. Id. at 33. 
